Endogenous skill formation, foreign capital and education subsidy in a dual economy by Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Bandopadhyay, Titas Kumar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Endogenous skill formation, foreign
capital and education subsidy in a dual
economy
Sarbajit Chaudhuri and Titas Kumar Bandopadhyay
University of Calcutta
29. September 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41631/
MPRA Paper No. 41631, posted 1. October 2012 13:35 UTC
 1 
Endogenous skill formation, foreign capital and education 
subsidy in a dual economy 
 
                                                     Sarbajit Chaudhuri 
Dept. of Economics, University of Calcutta, India. 
 
Titas Kumar Bandopadhyay 
Dept. of Economics, Bagnan College, India. 
 
 
                                                    (This version: 29.09.2012) 
 
Address for communication: Dr. Sarbajit Chaudhuri, 23 Dr. P.N. Guha Road, 
Belgharia, Kolkata 700083, India. Tel: 91-33-2557-5082 (O); Fax: 91-33-2844-1490 
(P). 
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Endogenous skill formation and education subsidy in a dual 
economy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the advent of globalization the services sector has been assuming growing 
importance in many developing economies. The service sector1 is highly knowledge 
based and it needs highly skilled labour like doctors, advocates, computer experts, 
accountants. In a typical developing country there is scarcity of both capital and skilled 
labor. Therefore, economic growth induced by foreign capital inflows and skill formation 
are equally important from the perspective of these nations. However, most of the 
developing economies like India have a significant shortage of skilled labour. So, the 
formation of highly skilled labour should be given top priority in the growth process of 
the developing countries. Education works as catalyst to the process of skill formation. 
The spread of higher education enhances the speed of skill formation and thus a large 
volume of skilled labours can be generated in the economy. The poor cannot afford much 
for their education and in this situation, the role of the government is quite important here 
because it provides education subsidy to spread education and encourage skill formation. 
 
Governments all over the world devote substantial resources to their education sector. 
This is especially true in developing countries. In 1995, public spending on education 
accounted for 15.7% of total government expenditure in developing countries (see Bedi 
and Garg (2000)).  Furthermore, the majority of students in developing countries are 
educated in publicly funded and publicly managed educational institutions. According to 
Jimenez and Lockheed (1995), almost 90% of all primary and 70% of all secondary 
enrollments in developing countries are in public schools.  
 
Now-a-days, in many developing economies the government plays a vital role in skill 
formation by providing education subsidy to the poor families. We observe this in many 
                                                 
1
 This may be a healthcare sector providing healthcare facilities to the population. 
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Western countries also. Some developing countries employ statutory bodies to monitor 
the function of higher academic institutions. For example, in India there is the University 
Grant Commission (UGC) that has been coordinating, determining and maintaining 
standards of university education and teaching in the country for the last five decades or 
so. The UGC allocates grants to universities and colleges out of its own funds for their 
development or other general purposes and advises the central and state governments on 
disbursing grants to universities out of the Consolidated Fund of India. The education 
subsidy speeds up the rate of skill formation and this process has genuine effects on 
skilled-unskilled wage gap and unemployment of labour. 
 
An important effect of the ongoing economic reforms is on the deteriorating skilled- 
unskilled wage inequality in the developing economies. Empirical studies strongly 
suggest that the skilled- unskilled wage gap has increased in many developing economies 
in the post reform period.  The studies of Robbins (1994; 1995; 1996) and Wood (1997) 
etc. have shown that such wage inequality has downward trends in the East Asian 
countries, while in the Latin American countries like Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica and 
Columbia it has increased in the post reform period. The studies of Khan (1998) and 
Tendulkar et al. (1996) have also shown indirectly the increased wage inequality in many 
South Asian developing economies including India.  
 
Theoretically, the deteriorating wage gap in the post reform period has been explained in 
the work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Marjit et al. (2004), Marjit and Acharyya 
(2003), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007) and Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2007). Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996) have shown that an inflow of foreign capital has led to the increased 
production of skilled intensive commodities in Mexico, thereby causing a falling relative 
demand for unskilled labour. Marjit et al. (2004) have shown that the nature of capital 
mobility between the formal and the informal sectors, the diverse trade pattern and 
market fragmentation in the world trade may adversely affect the skilled –unskilled wage 
gap in many developing economies. However, none of these papers analyze the process 
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of endogenous skill formation.2 There is, however, a paper by Kar and Beladi (2004) that 
has studied the welfare implications of skill formation and international migration of both 
skilled and unskilled labor using a four-sector general equilibrium framework. However, 
they have not considered the inflow of foreign capital and its impact on skilled- unskilled 
wage inequality in the presence of skill formation. 
 
 
Another important outcome of the reform programs has been significant rise in the 
unemployment problem. The unemployment problem may be voluntary or involuntary. 
But, economists and policymakers are concerned about the involuntary unemployment 
where unemployed workers are willing to work at a lower wage rate but cannot find any 
job owing to structural bottlenecks, insufficient demands, protectionist policies by the 
developed countries etc. Although in any general equilibrium model the existence of 
unemployment can be explained in different ways, the Harris-Todaro (1970) type 
unemployment has probably received the most attention because this structure captures 
quite a few number salient features of the developing countries e.g. economic dualism, 
labour market imperfection and the rural-urban migration phenomenon.  
  
The present paper develops a three sector general equilibrium model by incorporating 
endogenous skill formation and unemployment of unskilled labour. Two types of labour 
are considered here: skilled and unskilled labour. The process of skill formation is 
generated on the part of the unskilled working families who determine the supply of 
unskilled workers on the basis of intertemporal utility maximization. The skilled labour is 
fully employed, whereas there is Harris-Todaro (1970) type unemployment of unskilled 
labour. The paper also assumes that the government provides an education subsidy which 
is financed by a part of the tariff revenues that reduces the cost of skill formation. Our 
theoretical analysis gives some interesting results. An inflow of foreign capital raises the 
price of the non-traded goods under some reasonable conditions. The non-traded sector 
may expand and the urban manufacturing sector may contract due to the inflow of foreign 
                                                 
2
 As related, Stark (1998), Chau and Stark (1999) and Fan and Stark (2007) have studied skill 
formation and international migration by focusing on skill acquisition incentives created by the 
prospect of migration. 
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capital. The wage effect of the policy shows that both the skilled and the unskilled wage 
rates increase. However, the relative wage inequality (between skilled- unskilled labour) 
always worsens under some reasonable conditions. Further, an inflow of foreign capital 
may improve the urban unemployment problem of unskilled labour. The average 
unskilled wage (rural sector wage) increases and the urban unemployment level of 
unskilled labour may decreases. So, as a whole the unskilled the economic conditions of 
the unskilled workers improves. However, as the relative wage inequality worsens, the 
income of the skilled labour rises more than that of unskilled labour. We have provided 
an explanation why the wage inequality deteriorates in the developing countries in a 
manner which is different from the Feenstra and Hanson (1996) paper. Besides, the urban 
unemployment problem of unskilled labour mitigates which is contrary to the standard 
Harris-Todaro (1970) result. The last but not least, the endogenous determination of the 
supply of unskilled labour has not much role to play in the whole theoretical exercise. 
Some of these results, especially that on unemployment is counterintuitive and new in the 
theoretical literature on trade and development and have important policy implications 
for a developing economy which is scarce in the supply of both skilled labour and 
unemployment.   
 
2. The Model 
 
In this model the supply of unskilled labour is endogenously determined from the 
intertemporal utility maximizing behaviour of the unskilled working families. We 
consider a small open dual economy consisting of L and S numbers of unskilled and 
skilled working families, respectively. The rural sector is the origin of all unskilled 
working families while the urban sector is the origin of the skilled working families. In 
each unskilled working family, there are n numbers of members. There are provisions for 
skill formation on the part of the unskilled workers. Each unskilled working family 
sends lS number of members for skill formation while the remaining ( )n lS− members 
work as unskilled labour in period 1. In period 2, lS members become skilled labour 
while the remaining ( )n lS− members continue to work as unskilled labour. We assume 
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that there is a separate capitalist class who are the owners of capital and they do not 
supply any labour. On the other hand, the question of skill formation on the part of skilled 
family members does not arise.  
 
Our dual economy consists of three sectors: a rural sector and two urban sectors. The 
rural sector (sector 1) produces an agricultural commodity with the help of unskilled 
labour and capital. Sector 2 is an urban sector that produces a manufacturing commodity 
by means of both unskilled and skilled labour and capital. The unskilled labour market in 
sector 2 is imperfect. Here unskilled workers are organized and receive a higher 
unionized wage than what their counterparts receive in the agricultural sector. Due to the 
existence of a rural-urban wage gap some unskilled workers migrate to the urban sector 
to get jobs in the higher-paid sector 2. But all of them do not get jobs so that some of 
them remain as unemployed and hang around the urban sector with the hope that they 
would obtain jobs in the unionized sector in period 2. The skilled workers, however, 
receive a competitive wage. Sector 3 is the service sector that produces a non-traded 
high-skill product (services) by means of skilled labour and capital. So, unskilled labour 
is imperfectly mobile between sector 1 and sector 2. Skilled labour is mobile between 
sector 2 and sector 3 while capital is perfectly mobile among all the three sectors of the 
economy. 
 
There is Harris-Todaro (1970) type unemployment of unskilled labour in the economy. 
Capital and skilled labour are fully utilized. Capital endowment of the economy consists 
of both domestic capital and foreign capital and these are perfect substitutes. Prices of 
commodities 1 and 2 are given by the small open economy assumption while price of 
commodity 3 is determined domestically. Competitive markets, except the urban market 
for unskilled labour, CRS technologies with diminishing marginal productivities of inputs 
are assumed. Finally, commodity 1 is taken to be numeraire. 
 
The following notations will be used in the model. 
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Xi = level of output produced in sector i , 1,2,3i = ; a ji  = amount of the jth input 
required to produce one unit of the i th commodity; β = time discount factor; Li = level of 
employment in i th sector; 1P =1 (commodity 1 is the numeraire); 2P = world price of 
commodity 2; 3P = domestically determined price of commodity3; W = rural unskilled 
wage rate; *W = unionized unskilled wage in sector 2; WA =average unskilled wage rate; 
WS  = skilled wage rate; r  = rate of return on capital; lS  = number of family members 
sent out for skill formation: L = numbers of unskilled working families; S  = numbers of 
skilled working families; S = level of skilled workers; n =number of members in each 
unskilled working family; ( )n lS−  = supply of unskilled labour by each unskilled 
working family; ( )L n l LS= − = aggregate supply of unskilled labour in the economy; 
K = total stock of capital in the economy; KD  = stock of domestic capital in the 
economy; KF  = inflow of foreign capital in the economy; Lu  = urban unemployment 
level of unskilled labour; ^  = proportional change; V = level of utility enjoyed by each 
unskilled working family; iC = consumption in the i th period, 1,2i = ; B = the cost of 
skill formation per worker; E = amount of education subsidy provided by the 
Government; t = tariff rate; iD = demand function for the i th commodity, i =1,2,3; jiθ = 
distributive share of the j  th input in the i th sector, i  =1, 2,3 ; , ,j L K S= ; jiλ = 
proportion of the j th input employed in the i  th sector, i  =1, 2, 3 ; , ,j L K S= ; ijkS = 
the degree of substitution between factors j  and k  in the i th sector, 1,2i = , 3  
with 0ijkS > for j k≠ and 0ijjS < ; m  = marginal propensity to consume the import good 
(commodity 2); Y =domestic factor income of the economy. 
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2.1 Household behaviour of unskilled working families and derivation of family 
supply function of unskilled labour 
 
The supply function of unskilled labour by each working family is determined from its 
intertemporal utility maximizing behaviour. We consider a two period optimizing 
problem of the representative unskilled working family consisting of n members. lS  is 
the number of unskilled workers going for skill formation and they earn zero income in 
period 1. But in period 2 they earn the skilled wageWS while ( )n lS−  number of unskilled 
workers earns the unskilled wage W in both the periods. In the presence of positive return 
to skill formation, the skilled wage WS is not at least less thanW .
3
 
 
We assume that each unskilled working family cares only about the lifetime family 
consumption. The utility is therefore a function of consumption levels in the two periods 
(1and 2 ). For algebraic simplicity we assume a logarithmic utility function with unitary 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
 
log log1 2V C Cβ= +                                                (1) 
. 
The first period’s consumption ( 1C ) consists of wage income of ( )n lS−  number of 
family members that do not go for skill formation less the costs of skill formation of 
the lS number of family members. The cost of skill formation per worker is ( )B E which 
is a decreasing function of the amount of education subsidy, E , provided by the 
government. So, 
( ) ( )1C W n l l B ES S= − −                                        (2)                                              
 
                                                 
3
 This is because otherwise no one would be interested in skill formation. 
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The second period’s consumption ( 2C ) can be thought of as the sum of skilled wage of 
lS members of the family who have been upgraded as skilled labour by that time and 
unskilled wage of ( )n lS− members who worked in period 1 as unskilled labour.  
( )2C W n l W lS S S= − +                                                    (3) 
 
So the costs of skill formation include both the opportunity cost in terms of forgone 
unskilled wage income of lS members of the family plus direct costs, ( )l B ES . 
 
The unskilled working family maximizes the lifetime utility (Equation (1)) with respect 
to Sl and subject to (2) and (3). Maximization gives the following first-order condition4 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1W W l W B E Wn W W W B ES S Sβ β − + + = − − +                                     (4) 
 
So, the family supply function of unskilled labour is5 
( ) ( )
( )
( ){ }( ) 1
W B En Sn lS W B EW WS
β
β
 
 
− = +
 + +
−  
                                                                  (5) 
The aggregate supply function of unskilled labour in the economy is given by 
( )L n l LS= − = ( ) ( )
( )
( ){ }1
W B EnL S
W B EW WS
β
β
 
 +
 + +
−  
                                                         (6) 
In general form, this function may be written as6 
( , , )  SL L W W E=                                                                                                               (7) 
                                                 
4
 Interested readers can check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
 
5
 Interested readers can check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
 
6
 Interested readers can check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
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where
( )
( )0 if ( ) 21
W BL S
W W
β
β
−∂
> ≤
∂ +
       
(This implies that W  is not sufficiently low.) 
and 0, 0L L
W ES
∂ ∂ 
< < ∂ ∂ 
                                                                                              (8) 
 
2.2. The general equilibrium structure of the model: 
 
Now, we describe the general equilibrium structure of the model in the following way 
The competitive profit conditions are given by the price unit cost equalities: 
11 1Wa raL K+ =            (9) 
(1 )2 2 2 2W a W a ra P tL S S K
∗ + + = +                                                                                    (10) 
3 3 3W a ra PS S K+ =                                                      (11) 
 
The capital endowment of the economy consists of both domestic and foreign capital, 
which, are perfect substitutes. Full employment of capital is given by 
                                                                                                          
1 1 2 2 3 3a X a X a X K K KK K K D F+ + = + =                                                                 (12)      
 
Skilled labour is also fully employed and the full-employment condition is given by  
 2 2 3 3a X a X SS S+ =                                                                                                            (13)     
 
However, unskilled labour is not fully employed. There is Harris-Todaro (HT) 
unemployment of unskilled labour and its endowment equation is as follows.                                                         
( ), ,1 1 2 2a X a X L L W W EL L u S+ + =                                                                             (14)  
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The aggregate supply function of unskilled labour is endogenously determined and is 
given by 
( , , )  L L W W ES=                                                                                                            (15) 
It satisfies the following properties. 
( )
( )0 if ( ) 21
W BL S
W W
β
β
−∂
> ≤
∂ +
; 0, 0L L
W ES
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
.        
 
In an HT framework the unskilled labour allocation mechanism is such that in the labor 
market equilibrium, the rural wage rate, ,W equals the expected wage income in the urban 
sector. Since the probability of finding a job in the urban low-skill manufacturing sector 
is ( / ( ))2 2 2 2a X a X LL L u+ the expected unskilled wage in the manufacturing sector 
is ( * / ( ))2 2 2 2W a X a X LL L u+ . Therefore, the rural-urban migration equilibrium 
condition of unskilled labour is expressed as 
( * / ( ))2 2 2 2W a X a X L WL L u+ = , 
or equivalently, 
( ), ,1 1 2 2Wa X a X L W W EL L SW
∗
+ =
                                                                             (16) 
 
The demand functions for commodity 2 and commodity 3 are respectively given as 
follows.  
( ) ( ) ( )
*( , , )2 2 2 3
               
               
D D P P Y=
− + +
                                                                                                     (17)   
and,
 
( )
*( , , )3 3 2 3
               (+)  (-)  
D D P P Y=
+                                                                                                       (18) 
As foreign capital income is completely repatriated the expression for national income at 
domestic prices is given by 
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( )1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2Y X P X P X rK tP D X EF∗= + + − + − −                                                       (19) 
or equivalently,  
( ) ( ){ }, , 2 2 2SY WL W W E rK W S rK tP D X ED S F= + + − + − −                                  (19.1)                                                       
It is assumed that government’s total revenue consists of tariff revenue. A part of the 
revenues is spent for providing educational subsidies and the remaining part is paid back 
to the consumers in a lump-sum manner.  
 
The output of market 3 is non-traded. So its market must clear domestically by demand-
supply mechanism. Thus, the market equilibrium condition for commodity 3 is given by 
*( , , )3 2 3 3
               
D P P Y X=
                                                                                                         (20) 
There are three groups of unskilled workers in this system earning different wages. Unskilled 
workers employed in the rural sector and the organized urban sector receive a competitive wage, 
,W  and the unionized wage, *W , respectively while the unemployed urban workers earn 
nothing.  
The average wage for unskilled labour is given by 
( * )1 2W W WA L Lλ λ≡ +                                                                                        (21) 
where 1Lλ  and 2Lλ denote the proportion of unskilled labour employed in sectors 1 and 2, 
respectively. Using (16), equation (21) can be simplified to:7 
WWA =                                                                                                                                   (21.1) 
Our model consists of eleven equations (9-16, 19, 20, 21.1) that determine eleven 
endogenous variables: , , , , , , , , , ,3 1 2 3W W W r P X X X L L Ys A u . The general equilibrium 
properties of the model are described as follows.  and W r
s
are determined from 
                                                 
7
 The average wage of the workers (unskilled workers in this case) in a Harris-Todaro (HT) 
economy is equal to the rural sector wage. This is a celebrated result in the development literature 
and is known as the ‘envelope property’ of the HT structure. 
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Equations (10) and (11) in terms of 3P . Plugging  r  in (9) W is determined. Using (17) 
Y is obtained as function of 3P  from (19). The values of ,1 2X X and 3X  are obtained as 
functions of 3P  from equations (12), (13) and (16). 3P  is solved from (20). Once 3P  is 
known the equilibrium values of all the variables are known as functions of the system 
parameters. Finally, L  and L
u
are obtained from equations (15) and (14), respectively.                                                       
 
3.  Comparative statics: 
 
We are now going to examine the effects of inflow of foreign capital on the skilled- 
unskilled wage gap and unemployment of unskilled labour in our small open economy.  
 
Totally differentiating Equations (9) – (13), (15) – (18), (19), (20) and using the 
Walrasian static stability condition in the market for commodity 3 and equation (21.1) 
and simplifying we can prove8 the following result can be obtained. 
Proposition 1: Even in the presence of endogenous skill formation an inflow of foreign 
capital raises the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a developing economy. 
 
The result as presented in proposition 1 can intuitively be explained as follows. In this 
indecomposable production system factor prices apart from commodity prices hinges on 
factor endowments. An increase in FK implies a reduction in the return to capital, r , 
which in turn affects both the skilled wage and the competitive unskilled wage. The 
direction of relative wage movements crucially depends on the rates of wage increases in 
the two sectors. As the return to capital falls, from the zero-profit conditions for sector 1 
and sector 2 it entails that saving on capital cost must lead to increases in both the wages, 
(rural unskilled wage and skilled wage). But which wage, skilled or unskilled, increases 
more must depend on the factor intensity conditions. As unskilled workers in sector 2 
receive the exogenously fixed unionized wage, we should bring both sector 1 and sector 2 
                                                 
8
 Interested readers can check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
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in the picture. This is because for a change in capital cost the two wages (skilled and 
competitive unskilled wage can change only if both of them are market determined. But, 
as two different types of labour are involved in this case we cannot say that one sector is 
skilled labour-intensive and the other is unskilled labour-intensive. However, as capital is 
the only common intersectorally mobile input and can vary freely due to any changes in 
system parameters we can still classify the two sectors in a very special sense of Jones 
and Neary (1984) in terms of distributive shares of capital. If ( 2 1K Kθ θ> ), sector 2 is 
more capital-intensive and while sector 1 is less capital-intensive. In the case where 
( 2 1K Kθ θ> ), capital cost would decrease more in sector 2 than in sector 1. 
Consequently, under this special capital intensity condition the proportion of increase in 
skilled wage (WS ) would be greater than that in competitive unskilled wage (W ). The 
relative wage inequality thus worsens.9 
 
Again taking total differentials of equations (14) and using (11), (13), (15), (17) and (18) 
the following proposition readily follows. 
Proposition 2: When unskilled manufacturing sector is less capital-intensive relative to 
the skilled service sector an inflow of foreign capital lowers the level of urban 
unemployment of unskilled labour in a developing economy if 0λ < .10  
 
In this indecomposable production system factor prices apart from commodity prices 
depend on factor endowments. An increase in KF implies a reduction in the return to 
capital, r , which in turn affects both skilled wage and competitive unskilled wage. Sector 
2 and sector 3 jointly form a HOSS as they use two common inputs, skilled labour and 
                                                 
9
 This result does not depend on the sign of θ . We find that 
3 2( ( )) ( )01 2 3
3 2
K K
L S S
S S
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
= − > <  according to 3 2( ( ) )
3 2
K K
S S
θ θ
θ θ
> < . See appendix for 
details.   
 
10
  An inflow of foreign capital produces ambiguous effects on the unemployment of unskilled 
labour if 0, 0 or 0, 0.θ λ θ λ> < < >  
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capital. In the migration equilibrium the expected urban wage for a prospective rural 
migrant equals the actual rural wage. We are considering the case where sector 3 is more 
capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2. Sector 3 might be services sectors like healthcare 
sector where the capital intensity of production is significantly high. In other words, this 
sector uses capital (skilled labor) more (less) intensively than sector 2. An inflow of 
foreign capital affects the migration equilibrium in two ways. First, the urban sector 
contracts when 0λ <  as capital is drained out from sector 2 to other sectors. This leads 
to a decrease in the number of jobs available in this sector. Hence the expected urban 
wage for a prospective rural migrant,{ * /1 ( / )},3 3W L a Xu L+ falls as the probability of 
getting a job in this sector rises for every worker. This paves the way for reverse 
migration from the urban sector to the rural sector. This is negative the centrifugal force 
that instead of driving the rural workers to move away from the rural sector sends many 
of them back to the latter sector. If the rural sector wage remains unchanged, the number 
of new jobs abolished in the urban sector falls short of the number of new rural bound 
workers from the urban sector. In such a situation, the level of urban unemployment falls 
unambiguously. If the rural sector wage remains unchanged, the urban unemployment level 
plummets unequivocally. This is the contrary to the result as obtained in the two sector mobile 
capital HT model such as Corden and Findlay (1975). However, there is another effect in the 
picture too. The rural sector wage rises. which would attract people to remain in the rural 
sector. This is the positive centripetal force that prevents rural workers from migrating 
into the urban sector. Thus, both the the centripetal and the centrifugal forces work in the 
same direction. The urban unemployment level of unskilled labour decreases when 
0λ < .11  
 
However, if 0λ > , sector 2 expands and sector 3 contracts. More jobs are now created 
in the urban sector. The centrifugal force would now be positive leading to a fresh 
                                                 
11
 Interested readers obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
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migration for the rural to the urban sector. As there are now two forces working in the 
opposite direction to each other, the net result would be ambiguous. 
 
4. Concluding remarks:                                                                          
 
Developing countries have placed a high priority on skill formation to overcome the 
scarcity of skilled labor. They have subsidized their education system and also allowed 
the inflow of foreign capital in the economy. In this circumstance, one pertinent question 
arises: how the inflow of foreign capital affects wage inequality and unemployment of 
unskilled labour in the presence of skill formation. The present paper is designed to 
provide answer to the above question in terms of a three-sector Harris-Todaro (1970) 
type general equilibrium model with endogenous skill formation. and unemployment of 
unskilled labour. The process of skill formation is undertaken in the unskilled sector 
where each unskilled working family decides how many workers to send for skill 
formation on the basis of the intertemporal utility maximisation. This gives birth to the 
endogenous supply of unskilled labour. The process of skill formation entails some costs, 
a part of which is borne by the government’s subsidy on education. So the average cost of 
acquiring skill is a decreasing function of the education subsidy provided by the 
Government. 
 
Our analysis shows that under some reasonable conditions an inflow of foreign capital 
may raise the price of the non-traded goods. The urban manufacturing sector may 
contract whereas the non-traded sector may expand with the inflow of foreign capital. 
This policy pushes both the skilled and the unskilled wages upward and also raises the 
skilled-unskilled wage gap. Further, an inflow of foreign capital may lower the level of 
urban unemployment of the unskilled labour in a small open economy under some 
reasonable conditions. Some of these results are counterintuitive to the standard literature 
and these results may provide a theoretical foundation of the empirical findings regarding 
the behaviour of macroeconomic variables like unemployment, wage inequality and 
domestic price in the post reform period.  
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So, the unskilled labour force in isolation becomes better off as the unemployment level 
decreases and the average wage (rural sector wage) increases. But, if we compare their 
relative position with skilled labour, they become relatively worse off as the skilled-
unskilled wage inequality worsens i.e. the skilled wage rises at a higher rate than the 
average unskilled wage. The result on unemployment of unskilled labour is contrary to 
conventional Harris-Todaro (e.g. Corden and Findlay (1975)) result that an urban 
development policy becomes counterproductive.  
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